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Abstract 
International negotiations have failed to achieve an ambitious outcome to limit climate risks. A Cournot 
outcome where countries determine their mitigation commitments in the full knowledge of those by 
others could be an important step. It would avoid a Stackelberg (leader-follower) outcome where one or 
more major emitters impose a level of climate risk on the rest of the world. This requires these countries 
to have sufficiently similar preferences over global cumulative emissions. We develop a novel stylised 
economic growth model to analyse the dynamics of international negotiations. Economies can be 
classified according to their committed emissions and the initial level of atmospheric CO2. We define a 
new metric, the desired mitigation effort, which provides an empirical methodology for comparing and 
evaluating countries’ mitigation commitments. A numerical calibration suggests a degree of 
convergence between the major emitters that might allow a Cournot-style agreement at the Paris 
Conference in 2015. 
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1  Introduction 
To limit climate risks, a substantial and sustained reduction in global energy-related 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions remains the critical policy and practical challenge. This 
paper aims to provide qualitative and quantitative insight into some key influences on the 
dynamics of international climate discussions arising from heterogeneity in national 
economic and technological endowments.   
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we wish to contrast the usual 
modelling of damages as a reduction in the productivity of an economy with an approach 
where damages may also destroy capital (and human life)6. Recent impacts of extreme 
weather events, both in developing and rich countries can only reinforce the need for such an 
approach. Second, we compare the level of mitigation effort by economies at very different 
stages of economic and technological development, which is a key issue for climate 
negotiations. Third, we perform some numerical calibrations to understand whether the 
Cournot equilibrium in mitigation action might be feasible given the diversity of countries 
that are central to international climate negotiations. We see this latter as an essential 
stepping stone to potentially more ambitious action.  
Central to this analysis is the derivation of what we call the “Desired Mitigation 
Effort” (DME) for each country, closely related to the concept of a “Desired Carbon Budget” 
(DCB) which emerges from the model in a linear utility setting.  As is well known (e.g. 
Wigley et al. 1996 and more recently, Allen et al., 2009), it is the cumulative level of CO2 in 
the atmosphere, not the level of annual emissions, which largely determines the change in 
global mean surface temperature, the most convenient index of climate change.  Hence, 
effective international mitigation requires countries to commit to an emissions path and an 
allocation of emissions across countries that, either implicitly or explicitly, is consistent with 
global cumulative carbon emissions corresponding to achieving a given temperature with an 
agreed probability as given by climate models. 
We develop a stylised integrated assessment model to address the above three points. 
It also enables a symmetrical treatment of the short and long-term, therefore isolating - and 
facilitating a more effective analysis of – the implications of different weightings over the 
level and profile of lifetime consumption and the longer-term impacts of climate change7.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 We do not, however, include natural capital or ecosystem services. 
7 This resembles Chichilinsky (1995)’s sustainable preferences approach, but differs in that the model does not focus on the strictly infinite 
time properties of the utility function, but rather on the impact of climate change on the utility of the bequest from current to future 
generations. 
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This is particularly useful in view of the controversy over discount rates, which has clouded 
climate policy discussions (Stern, 2013). Additionally, in the limit of linear utility, the model 
delivers analytical results and is simple enough to allow extension to study technological 
change and adaptation (see Leib, 2013). Fully articulated and well-developed integrated 
assessment models would not allow such an analysis. Whilst they can provide analysis of 
Cournot behaviour for particular regions, they model damages as impacting on productivity 
(Nordhaus, 2010), and/or highlight the collective action problems of securing an effective 
international agreement (e.g.  Bosetti et al. 2009,  Bréchet et al. 2011). A benchmark model is 
first considered where the world behaves as a representative agent that maximises global 
social welfare. We then extend to a two-country model. Social welfare is a function of both 
the short-term (i.e. consumption in periods one and two) and the impact of climate damages 
on a bequest made to future generations.  
How do our results relate to current international negotiations on climate change? 
Whatever the eventual level of cumulative CO2 emissions, one way to look at the current 
phase of the negotiation process is as a form of discovery.  For a number of reasons, countries 
are unsure of both the long-term marginal and absolute costs of ambitious mitigation and of 
its benefits in terms of avoided climate and other damages. National mitigation commitments 
are framed in terms of reductions in the flow of emissions or in emissions intensity by a 
certain point of time relative to a baseline. Despite a professed commitment to a 2ºC 
international target, current action falls short of that needed to achieve a 2ºC increase in 
global mean temperature target (UNEP, 2013). National targets are therefore at best an 
imperfect signal of countries’ - perhaps yet to be determined - preferences over the global 
level of cumulative emissions, coloured as they are by political, economic and social 
perspectives in addition to – and sometimes overshadowing – our scientific understanding of 
climate change.  
Game theory considerations can provide a simplified view of the intuition we have in 
mind. The illustrative framework in Figure 1 shows a theoretical two-country world in which 
representative agents have choices over the ultimate level of their cumulative emissions. The 
negotiations so far have aimed at moving beyond Business as Usual levels of cumulative 
emissions towards the most environmentally effective “cooperative” outcome within a 
relatively short period of time, despite less than propitious economic and technological 
circumstances.  There is a large literature on the difficulties of reaching a fully co-operative 
outcome to international climate policy (see Bréchet et al. 2011 and Barrett, 2003 for a 
discussion). Global-level negotiations on their own may also be inadequate in building the 
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levels of trust and transparency needed for an effective climate change regime (see Ostrom, 
2009)8.  
 
Figure 1. An illustrative emissions reduction game for two countries.  
(Countries start at the BAU level and can gradually move to either the non-cooperative 
Cournot or the Stackelberg outcome.  In the case of the Cournot outcome, negotiations might 
subsequently improve on this by moving the countries closer to the co-operative level of 
cumulative emissions.) 
 
However, given heterogeneity in economic scale, investment and levels of emissions, 
and the presence of a limited number of major emitters there is a real risk that the world could 
end up in a “Stackelberg” or leader-follower outcome instead (the yellow circle in Figure 1), 
where one or more large emitting countries exercise first mover advantage and reduce the 
carbon budget available for others. The decisions of a few major emitters would then 
determine the climate risks and outcomes faced by the rest of the world.   
Theory suggests that the result of a negotiation process on the quantity of cumulative 
CO2 emissions could instead be a Cournot equilibrium, where each country determines its 
own level of mitigation effort taking that of the other country as given. Although the level of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Edenhofer et al. (2012) review the incentives for unilateral action (such as co-benefits and technological leadership) and decentralized 
efforts that might alleviate these collective action problems. 
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mitigation would almost certainly be insufficient to achieve the sort of ambitious goals 
currently under discussion, securing such an outcome in the short-term could have two 
important benefits.  First, it would provide the basis for a more ambitious co-operative 
agreement at a later stage with more advanced technologies, greater levels of trust between 
parties and effective monitoring and verification systems in place. Second, a credible and 
sufficiently ambitious Cournot outcome would be the most effective way of ensuring we 
avoid something worse, i.e. the Stackelberg outcome or an inability to move from BAU 
levels.  Reaching agreement on such an outcome may therefore be the critical challenge for 
the 2015 Paris meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 21).   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a world 
economy model with a single representative agent. Section 3 describes the key results and 
discusses their implications for climate policy. In Section 4, we extend this approach to a 
two-country world where climate change becomes an externality.  Section 5 provides a 
calibration of the world economy model and a calibration of individual countries’ desired 
mitigation effort. Section 6 offers concluding remarks on the relevance of this work to the 
international climate negotiations.  
2  A world economy model 
Time is discrete and is divided in three periods. Production and its related emissions 
only take place in the first two periods.  We consider a simple carbon cycle in which a 
constant fraction of the stock of CO2 above some reference level (Sn) is absorbed by other 
components of the earth system in each period. If we denote by S0 the initial CO2 stock, 
cumulative CO2 levels at the end of the two periods of production/consumption are given by: 
  (1)  
Here γ is the emissions coefficients per unit of capital K deployed in each period and (1-δ) is 
the fraction of CO2 which is naturally absorbed when CO2 levels are above their neutral pre-
industrial value, Sn. The change in temperature above its neutral level is a logarithmic 
function of the level of atmospheric CO2 and the climate sensitivity, Λ (see Myhre et al. 
(1998) for details). For a range of levels of CO2 above its neutral level9, we can approximate 
the change in temperature in a given period in relation to the level of CO2 in the previous 
period by the following relationship:  
 
 
(2)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Appendix 2 for more details. 
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As it is common in the literature, climate damages in period t (Dt) are assumed 
quadratic in the contemporaneous temperature change10:  
  (3)  
where bt>0 is a scale parameter that may depend on time. Using the two last equations, the 
damage function is: 
  (4)  
where t=3 refers to long term damages and  
 
 
(5)  
Damages can thus be expressed as the difference between the cumulative level of CO2 
at each period and their pre-industrial level. Because concentrations are driven by capital 
accumulation, there also exists a relationship between economic activity and the cumulative 
emissions.  We adopt a deterministic approach since the risk of catastrophic events seems to 
be a secondary influence on the dynamics of international climate negotiations (see Barrett 
and Dannenberg, 2012).  
We can now explicitly introduce the important idea that damages are to some extent 
dependant of the stage of development of the economy, represented here by the level of 
physical capital. First, damages can be due simply to loss of consumption (broadly 
interpreted) that is independent of physical capital – for example, loss in tourism revenue due 
to changed weather patterns. Second, with damages dependent on capital, we capture the 
extent to which having more physical assets exposed to climate damages may increase the 
scale of climate damages, for example flood damage in a city. Such a representation cannot 
be introduced in a damage functions in which the temperature increase is the argument. This 
means that the scale parameter B will depend on K:  
  (6)  
where ϵ>0 captures the sensitivity of damages to the level of capital.  Parameter Bt is defined 
as the economic sensitivity to climate change. Consumption is assumed to take place within 
periods 1 and 2 and is given by the GDP net of both investment and climate damages - in 
effect, “green consumption”: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Impacts of climate change in aggregate are assumed non-negative for the cumulative emissions ranges under consideration.  The model 
can be easily adapted to include any benefits that may occur for short term/small temperature increases. 
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  (7)  
Here At is the total factor productivity, d the capital depreciation rate, and Bt the 
economic sensitivity to climate damages. In the last period there is a bequest to future 
generations that is simply K2 net of long term climate damages: 
  (8)  
We assume that the utility of the representative agent is separable in consumption and 
the bequest, so that the representative agent’s utility function over time is given by: 
  (9)  
where ω represents the weight on present discounted utility ( . We also assume 
that the utility is separable in time for consumption in different periods, i.e.:  
  (10)  
Here  and θ is the pure rate of time preference.  Finally we assume that utility 
exhibits a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form, i.e.: 
 
 
(11)  
The marginal utility with respect to X (which may represent either consumption or the 
bequest) is then given by . The parameter  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient 
of relative risk aversion and its inverse is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption between two points of time: 
 
 
(12)  
So the smaller η, the more willing the agent is to trade consumption in one period for 
consumption in another in response to small changes in interest rates. 
3  Preliminary results for the world economy model 
We first analyse the properties of this benchmark model where the world behaves as a 
single representative agent. We will successively consider the “Business as Usual” (BAU) 
scenario (myopic agent, no policy), then a far-sighted agent solution, and finally the 
analytically soluble case with a linear utility function.  
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3.1 Myopic behaviour (Business as Usual) 
The representative agent maximises discounted utility from consumption in the 
standard way but is myopic and does not value the long-term bequest. In this “Business as 
Usual” (BAU) case, ω in Equation (9) is set equal to one and the welfare function is simply: 
  (13)  
To solve, we set the level of K2=0 since production beyond period 2 has no value. 
The first order condition for K1 yields the following optimal condition:  
 
 
(14)  
The marginal rate of substitution of period-one consumption for discounted period-
two consumption is equal to the inter-temporal price of period-two consumption in units of 
period-one consumption.  When this price is low (i.e. H is large), investment in period one 
yields high returns and the discounted marginal utility in period two will be small relative to 
marginal utility in period one. When ε=0, we have the textbook result for inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing, but when damages depend on the level of capital (i.e. ε>0), the price 
will increase with climate damages in period two, making it less attractive to invest and 
reducing the final level of CO2.  
Climate damages here depend not only on ε and B but also on the initial capital (K0) 
and CO2 endowments. The higher these are, the lower is the incentive to invest for the future. 
Consumption is falling over time whenever  i.e. when marginal climate damages are 
large relative to capital productivity net of depreciation: 
  (15)  
Rising consumption is only optimal when marginal climate damages are small relative 
to the direct returns to investment:  
  (16)  
This provides some intuition about national strategies when heterogeneous countries 
co-exist (see below).  
3.2 Far-sighted behaviour  
Arguably, a socially optimal climate policy should be concerned about the impact of 
climate damages on productive possibilities for future generations. There exist at least two 
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ways to model this. First, we could include in the social welfare function the level of the 
bequest net of climate damages and we would set ω>0 in Equation (9).  Alternatively, the 
agent might be concerned with the disutility of climate damages on the bequest, which is the 
level of the bequest net of climate damages relative to its counterfactual value without 
damages. Clearly, for CRRA utility with η>0, the disutility of damages would be largest for 
smaller levels of bequest. Here we choose the second version and the social planner 
maximises the following social welfare function: 
  (17)  
The bequest in the absence of long-term climate damages is defined simply as the 
level of capital bequeathed, which we express as a fraction (1-α) of the net resources 
available in period two after taking account of climate damages: 
  (18)  
The affine properties of the utility function allow the weight on the long-term to be defined 
as: 
 
 
(19)  
We leave open the possibility that .  
We use the same functional form for climate damages as in Equation (3).  The 
detailed solutions to this problem are given in Annex 1. By combining the first order 
conditions for K1 and α, we find the inter-temporal condition for marginal utilities: 
 
 
(20)  
where H is defined as in Equation (14).   
Comparing with the myopic case (see Equation (14)), we immediately note that if the 
parameter Φ is set to zero, this reduces to the BAU solution, as it should. For Φ>0, the term 
within the curly bracket will always be less than unity if S2>Sn and for non-zero, positive 
values of the other parameters. In other words, optimally there will always be more 
mitigation than in the BAU case for a given positive value of H since, in the absence of an 
alternative clean technology, the agent chooses optimally to shift consumption into period 
one relative to the BAU case, reducing marginal long-term damages.   
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We can define the Desired Mitigation Effort (DME) as the key (composite) parameter 
determining the scale of mitigation relative to the BAU case:  
 
 
(21)  
DME increases with the size of Φ and is inversely related to H, the inter-temporal 
price, which also has slightly offsetting indirect impacts on behaviour through K2. 
Technology has an unambiguous effect on both DME and H (through S1): the dirtier the 
technology, the greater will be the extent of optimal CO2 mitigation. The same is true for the 
sensitivity to climate damages, ϵ, and the size of the climate damage parameter, B.  
3.3 Desired Carbon Budgets  
Understanding the detailed behaviour of Equation (20) in general requires numerical 
calibrations, which we provide in Section 5.  It is however useful to examine the limiting, 
(though admittedly unrealistic) case of a linear utility function (η=0), which admits analytical 
solution. This corresponds to the representative agent being infinitely willing to shift 
consumption in response to small changes in H.  As we shall see, this case helps us to 
understand the mitigation incentives of different economies and therefore provides some 
insight into the dynamics of the international climate change negotiations.    
The social welfare function now becomes: 
  (22)  
Note that this depends only on the lifetime present value of consumption and long-
term climate damages, with K2=0 optimally.  This yields a solution for the optimal level of 
net cumulative emissions (Ω*) – in effect the Desired Carbon Budget (DCB), of which some 
has already been used since S0>Sn by construction:  
 
 
(23)  
The DCB is determined by equating the net marginal benefit of investing and emitting 
an extra unit of CO2, which is , and the long-term marginal climate damages from 
emitting an additional unit of CO2, which is 2ΦB(S2-Sn).  Note that the marginal benefit of 
emitting an additional unit of CO2 increases as the emissions intensity falls and, in this linear 
case, we see a strong rebound effect which is strongly moderated by consumption smoothing 
when η>0.  We would also see a smaller rebound effect even in the linear utility model if Φ 
11	  
	  
depended inversely on γ, which would imply that countries with cleaner technology cared 
more about the long-term11.   
Together with non-negative C1 and C2, the linear utility model provides a simple two-
dimensional classification scheme for different possible economic worlds based on the level 
of initial endowments of: (i) atmospheric CO2; and (ii) first period or “committed” emissions, 
γK0, both scaled by Ω.  The position of a theoretical possible world in this two-dimensional 
parameter space completely determines its behaviour.  
Figure 2 illustrates six cases when for simplicity, damages are not sensitive to capital 
and there is no capital depreciation. In Region 1, it would be able to optimize freely. While a 
world with large committed, γK0, would find it optimal to disinvest (mitigate) strongly 
(Region 1a – perhaps typified by rich, developed economies), a world with lower committed 
emissions would mitigate less strongly and continue to invest, though at a lower level than for 
the BAU case (Region 1b – perhaps exemplified by China and India, now taking on voluntary 
emissions intensity reductions).  With η=0, the agent would choose the same DCB anywhere 
within in Region 1.  This strong conclusion is of course modified for η>0.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Economic classification scheme for illustrative parameter values.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Keulartz et al. (2004) for a discussion of the ethical challenges stemming from technological change and development in different 
contexts. 
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Region 2 represents an economy where committed emissions are even smaller relative 
to Ω, because the capital endowment is smaller and/or the technology is cleaner. The 
marginal benefits of investment exceed the long-term marginal damages and there is no 
optimal solution as in Equation (23). A world in Region 2 would behave myopically and 
investment would be resource constrained.  
For a world in any of the four remaining regions (3, 4, 5 and 6), climate damages 
would exceed the resources available for consumption in one or both periods.  If initial CO2 
and sensitivity to climate damages are sufficiently high relative to the capital endowment, 
then the world cannot achieve positive consumption in period one (Region 3 – perhaps 
typified by a vulnerable small island state).  If committed emissions and the initial level of 
CO2 are sufficiently high then the world will be unable to achieve positive consumption in 
period two12.  This corresponds to Regions 4 and 5 (in the latter, positive consumption is also 
unattainable in period one).   
The outer limit of economic feasibility is set by the solid line representing the point at 
which the level of capital in period two is zero.  This boundary is set by the carbon cycle, 
with the upper limit for the y-axis scaling as (1/δ2), and for the x-axis as (1/δ). If, as expected 
by the IPCC (2013), more emitted CO2 remains in the atmosphere as climate change 
progresses, the domain of economic feasibility will shrink.   
3.4 The relationship between DME and DCB 
The DME is a property of a possible world within this model whatever the initial 
capital, technology and CO2 endowments and precise form of the utility function. The DCB 
on the other hand exists only in the limiting case of linear utility and even then, only when 
these endowments position a possible world within Region 1 of Figure 2.  In such cases, it is 
straightforward to see that DME is inversely related to the DCB: 
 
 
(24)  
The multiplication factor here is just the difference between the discount factor, β, and 
the inter-temporal consumption price in the myopic case (Equation (14)), which in Region 1 
is positive.  
So far we have confined ourselves to a one country setting.  However, countries are 
heterogeneous and the DME or DCB for one country might be quite different to that for 
another different country. This matters enormously when, as they do now, a small number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is due to the assumption that production in period one uses the entire capital endowment, which we could relax. 
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countries are responsible for the majority of global CO2 emissions.  To understand how the 
realised level of cumulative emissions globally might relate to the optimal preferences of 
multiple individual countries, we now turn to a two-country version of the model.  
4  Two-country model 
We use a two-country version of our model to show how the intuitions in the world 
economy case relate to the more realistic and complex situation when there are several 
countries that act strategically. Each country (labelled by i, j) has a single technology with 
different productivity and emissions characteristics to capture real-world diversity. Initial 
endowments are also allowed to vary.  Global cumulative CO2 levels at the end of period t are 
the sum of the individual country emissions and are given by:  
  (25)  
The coefficient of emissions intensity, γ, may differ across countries, but is assumed 
constant through time. The initial level of CO2 is again S0 while we have set Sn=0 to save on 
notation.  Damages suffered by the ith country in period t can be written in the same way as 
for the one-country model, except that emissions from both countries now contribute:  
  (26)  
Green consumption within each period t for the ith country is given by:  
  (27)  
We have assumed a common depreciation rate across countries. As before, 
consumption must be non-negative. The bequest to future generations is again Ki,2 net of long 
term climate damages: 
  (28)  
We also define a bequest in the absence of long term damages, which is simply equal 
to the capital passed on to the next generation in each country: 
  (29)  
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Using similar notation to the one-country case, each country has a representative 
agent who maximises a welfare function for that country:  
  (30)  
We now assume a linear utility function to make easy comparison with Section 3.3.  
The representative agent for country i balances short-term consumption in the first two 
periods against the level of long-term climate damages to determine the optimal level of 
capital Ki,2=0: 
  (31)  
The long-term damages take this simple form because each agent optimally uses up 
its resources in the first two periods and therefore Ki(j),2=0.  
We recall from the Introduction that one of the possible outcomes in this situation is a 
Cournot equilibrium.  Assuming that constraints on consumption are satisfied and that the 
behaviour of country i does not strategically influence that of country j, we can solve the first 
order conditions for Ki(j),1 to find the DCB for country i: 
 
 
(32)  
The same equation holds for country j with just an interchange of labels. So the 
equation for the DCB for each country takes exactly the same form as the optimal global 
DCB in the one-country model. The difference here is that climate change has now become 
an externality since both countries are contributing to cumulative emissions and damages.  
The actual or realised cumulative level of atmospheric CO2 must of course be a 
unique value given by the sum of the emissions from both countries: 
  (33)  
An obvious but important point is that a symmetric Cournot equilibrium will only 
exist if and only if the DCB is equal across both countries: 
  (34)  
15	  
	  
However even this serendipitous case admits an infinity of solutions depending on the 
division of the cumulative emissions between countries.  Thus, while the cumulative level of 
CO2 is fully specified, the allocation of emissions between the two countries is not 
determined in this model and this will depend on their respective economic capacity and 
political bargaining power.  But at least a Cournot outcome would be feasible.  
Our main interest here is in whether the major emitting countries are sufficiently 
similar in their DCBs - or more generally their DMEs defined analogously to Equation (24) - 
for there to be a realistic prospect of agreement on a Cournot-type outcome at the Paris 2015 
COP meeting.  Or are the DCBs so different across major emitters that one or two of them 
could move the world to a (less appealing for others) Stackelberg equilibrium? The numerical 
calibrations in the next section allow us to provide some results on these issues.   
5  Calibration, numerical results and analysis 
We first provide a calibration of the world economy model in order to demonstrate the 
behaviour of the model in both the BAU and far-sighted versions and analyse how optimal 
behaviour depends on key parameters such as Φ and η.  We then calibrate Equation (21) to 
provide an initial estimate of DME for countries that constitute the Major Economies Forum13 
(MEF) and four of the poorest developing economies (Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Kenya and 
Chile). Together these countries account for nearly three-quarters of global CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel and cement production.     
5.1 The world economy 
Parameters used for the calibration are reported in Appendix 3. Figure 3 demonstrates 
how the weighting on long-term climate damages increases mitigation effort relative to the 
BAU case (Φ=0) and how this effect is amplified by increases in the utility parameter, η.  A 
strong consumption smoothing motive eventually becomes incompatible with a high 
weighting on long-term damages for a sufficiently dirty technology.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Launched in 2009, the MEF’s purpose was to foster a positive dialogue among major developed and developing economies in the run-up 
to the UN climate change conference in Copenhagen and beyond. The European Union as a whole is also part of the MEF, but we chose to 
focus our analysis on those European countries that are part of the MEF in their own right. See http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/ for 
more details. 
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Figure 3. Variation in optimal final atmospheric CO2 levels (ppmv) with parameters η and Φ. 
 
Figure 4. Divergence in final CO2 levels between the BAU and FAR solutions as the 
emissions coefficient varies. 
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Figure 4 shows the dependence of final CO2 levels in both the BAU and the far-
sighted cases on technology for η=1.  In BAU, CO2 concentrations reach 470 ppmv for the 
dirtiest technology shown, while even Φ=0.2 results in strong mitigation, with final CO2 
levels reaching only 400 ppmv for the same technology. Final CO2 levels in the far-sighted 
case are smaller for cleaner technologies; the strong rebound effect from the greater marginal 
benefit of emitting CO2 is offset by consumption smoothing.   
The sensitivity of damages to the level of capital is an important determinant of the 
optimal solution and the DME, as we shall see in our calibration of individual countries, to 
which we now turn.  
5.2 Desired Mitigation Effort (DME) for selected countries 
The relevant country parameters are reported in Appendix 3. These are based on 
economic data from the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (see Heston et al. (2002)) and CO2 
data from Boden et al. (2010).14 The series of the physical capital stocks, K, is derived 
applying the perpetual inventory method as in Hall and Jones (1999) or Bonfiglioli (2008).  
The initial stock of capital, K0 is estimated as: 
 
where I is investment at time 0 and g is the average geometric growth rate of total investment 
between t and t+10 years.  Given that according to this method, depreciation is already taken 
into account for the construction of a measure of capital, the depreciation from the equation 
of our model is equated to zero. The values derived for Russia are to be taken with caution 
given that the first years available cover the end of the Soviet economy, and we have 
therefore dropped negative values of investment for consistency. 
We chose to calibrate the parameter Φ by one tenth of the average share of GDP spent 
by government on education: the lower the share, the lower the Φ, reflecting the fact that the 
country does not weigh the future much. The source of the data is the World Bank (World 
Bank, 2011), where public expenditure on education includes both current and capital 
spending15.   
In order to estimate the sensitivity of damages to CO2 levels, B, we first need to derive 
national total damages costs in US$. Although such estimates are the object of wide criticism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In the countries for which the Penn World Tables report no data for 1960, we consider as the first year the earliest year available that is 
followed for that country by at least 15 observations. 
15 This includes also government spending on both public and private educational institutions, education administration and subsidies for 
private entities. 
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we adopt two different methods for the calibration: first, Nordhaus’s DICE model (Nordhaus 
2008) with the uniform global damages, independent of the level of capital; and second, 
Nordhaus’ DICE model but with damages dependent on capital, i.e. ϵ>0.  We assume that the 
global mean surface temperature change since pre-Industrial is around 0.85°C in line with 
recent estimates for the change over the period 1880-2012 (IPCC, 2013).   
Using these parameters, we estimate the DME for each country, including the first 
period emissions of all countries in the estimate of H.  The sensitivity of the DME to different 
values of ϵ is shown in Figure 5. Normalised to the UK’s DME, Figures 6 and 7 show the 
results for the two cases of ϵ=0 and ϵ=10-12.   
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Figure 5: Convergence of DME values as capital sensitivity of damages increases 
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Figure 6. Relative DME for ϵ=0 (normalised to UK’s DME) 
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Figure 7. Relative DME for ϵ=10-12 (normalised to UK’s DME) 
The importance of regional heterogeneity of damage functions has been explored 
elsewhere (e.g. Nordhaus, 2010).  Here we focus on what effect including capital-sensitive 
damages might have on DME, where Fig. 5 shows dramatic convergence with increasing 
values of ϵ. For ϵ=0 (Fig. 6), most major economies have a DME similar to or stronger than 
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that of the UK; indeed, Russia, China and India all have a higher relative DME. As expected, 
the poorest developing economies all have a very low DME.  South Korea and Australia have 
a weaker DME than the UK and most other developed economies.  However, the US DME is 
almost one order of magnitude greater than that of all of the other major emitters, raising 
serious questions over the assumption of uniform global damages independent of capital.  
For ϵ=10-12 (Fig. 7), the US’s DME is no longer the largest and is of the same order as 
that of other major economies.  There is also a strong reduction in the relative DMEs of some 
of the other capital-heavy economies (i.e. Japan, Germany, Russia and China), with a smaller 
reduction in France and Italy. We suggest that China’s low DME may well be an artefact of 
their large and relatively unproductive capital biasing down the value of the damages 
parameter, rather than any robust indication of a weaker propensity to mitigate.  Canada, 
India, Mexico, Australia, South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Chile all see 
an increase in their relative DME when capital-sensitive damages are included. This contrasts 
with the insensitivity of Brazil’s DME to this changed assumption.  The DME of the least 
developed countries remains far below that of the others, as expected from the stylised 
political economy of Section 3, with only Italy having a similar DME to Brazil and Chile for 
ϵ=10-12.  
 
6 Conclusion 
The stylized model developed in this paper provides an intuitive and tractable 
framework for conceptualising and analysing the strategic dynamics of the international 
climate negotiations.  By focusing on the trade-off of lifetime consumption against longer-
term climate damages and allowing damages to impact on the level, not just the productivity, 
of capital, the model yields both a political economy of climate negotiations and a 
methodology for a numerical assessment of individual countries’ optimal level of mitigation 
effort.  The political economy is far richer than the simple developed/developing country 
dichotomy that emerged from the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. In this 
more complex environment, our proposed new metric (Desired Mitigation Effort, or DME) 
may allow the development of quantitative indicators that could provide the basis for an 
empirically based assessment of the comparability or otherwise of mitigation efforts over 
time across heterogeneous countries.  
Whilst the approach taken in this paper does not include adaptation, technological 
change or population growth, the convergence amongst the major economies’ DMEs when 
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damages are assumed to be sensitive to levels of capital is potentially significant for policy. 
To the extent that this is a concern amongst parties, achieving an intermediate Cournot 
outcome may be possible in the current round of international negotiations. Many of the 
major emitting economies have significant economic self-interest in taking effective 
mitigation action nationally, provided that proportionate action is taken by others. However, 
the low DMEs for China and some smaller but still significant developed economies highlight 
the importance of achieving a Cournot equilibrium as the outcome of the current phase of 
negotiations in order to avoid the possibility of a Stackelberg outcome.   
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Appendix 1. One-country solution with disutility of long-term climate damages 
We want to maximise a social welfare function that explicitly has an element reflecting utility 
from discounted consumption over a lifetime and the disutility of climate change on the 
bequest to future generations.  This takes the form: 
 
Where we define the “myopic” bequest as simply the level of capital bequeathed without 
netting off long term climate damages: 
 
Where 
 
We can now find the first order conditions (FOCs). 
Differentiating wrt K1 
 
This yields after some manipulation: 
Equation A1.1: 
  
Differentiating wrt alpha, the second FOC is: 
 
Cancelling the common factor yields:  
Equation A1.2: 
 
We can now solve by substituting Equation A1.2 into Equation A1.1 to give: 
 
Where again 
25	  
	  
 
26	  
	  
 
Appendix 2. One country solution with exact form of CO2 forcing and for linear utility 
This appendix provides more details on the specification of Equation For small 
departures from the neutral level, we can expand the logarithm in terms of x, where 
 
i.e.  .  We therefore assume that a linear approximation is 
valid for the range of CO2 levels we are considering, which may be reasonable for CO2 
concentrations up to ~600 ppmv.  Further terms of the expansion of the logarithmic term 
would need to be included at higher CO2 levels.  We here compare the linear approximation 
with the quadratic and cubic approximations (see Figure A2.1) and also present the exact 
form solution of the model for the case of linear utility. Figure A2.1 gives the percentage 
error for the liner, quadratic and cubic approximations to the exact solution of ln(St/Sn) for a 
range of relevant CO2 concentrations. 
 
Figure A2.1. Percentage error in the linear, quadratic and cubic approximations to the 
quantity ln(St/Sn) using the Maclaurin series, ln(x) ~ x – x2/2 +x3/3. 
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For linear utility and the logarithmic form of the temperature-CO2 relationship, the 
problem is to maximise welfare, W, 
 
Where K2=0 and consumption and damages are given by: 
 
 
 
The equation defining the optimal level of S2 is then: 
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Appendix 3. Data 
Table 1. Estimated climate parameters  
Value a Units
Sn 2173.2 Gt CO2
S0 2838.4 Gt CO2
δ 0.319 -
Conversion factor for 1ppmv to mass of CO 2 b
1ppmv 7.817 Gt CO2 ppmv-1  
a. Source: IPCC AR5 for 1750 and Mauna Loa record 
b. Source: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/faq.html  
 
Table 2. Illustrative parameters for the world economy model 
Neutral level of CO2, Sn 2173.2 GtCO2
A30 world average 0.15
Phi Various
Y world 3.56E+13 $/year
K0 world 3.02E+14 $
Emissions coefficient, γ30 2.50E-12 GtCO2/$
Annual theta 0.005
Beta (30 years) 0.86
S0 - Sn 874.3 Gt CO2
Carbon cycle delta 0.3186
Sensitivity to damages, B 200000 $/GtCO2^2
Capital sensitivity of damages 0
Alpha 0.7
A1/A0 1.3
S0 3047.5 GtCO2
Typical world parameter values
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Table 3. Economic and emissions parameters for specified countries 
Country A30 a Y1990 b Kzero b
Total CO2 
emissions 
(1980-2009) c
γ30  a Φ	  d
United States 0.145 7.91E+12 5.45E+13 154.30 2.83E-12 0.56
Japan 0.093 3.52E+12 3.76E+13 33.09 8.79E-13 0.39
Germany 0.104 2.08E+12 2.00E+13 27.39 1.37E-12 0.45
Russia 0.111 1.93E+12 1.73E+13 74.83 4.31E-12 0.36
France 0.129 1.48E+12 1.15E+13 11.90 1.03E-12 0.56
China 0.062 1.45E+12 2.34E+13 103.79 4.43E-12 0.22
Italy 0.110 1.42E+12 1.29E+13 12.61 9.80E-13 0.46
UK 0.167 1.41E+12 8.45E+12 16.55 1.96E-12 0.51
India 0.151 1.18E+12 7.81E+12 28.51 3.65E-12 0.35
Brazil 0.133 1.09E+12 8.20E+12 7.95 9.70E-13 0.42
Canada 0.148 7.68E+11 5.19E+12 14.30 2.75E-12 0.55
Mexico 0.140 7.46E+11 5.33E+12 10.65 2.00E-12 0.48
S Korea 0.106 4.90E+11 4.63E+12 9.94 2.15E-12 0.41
Australia 0.127 4.37E+11 3.44E+12 9.13 2.65E-12 0.48
Indonesia 0.114 4.26E+11 3.75E+12 6.78 1.81E-12 0.30
South Africa 0.115 2.07E+11 1.80E+12 10.71 5.94E-12 0.53
Bangladesh 0.183 9.02E+10 4.92E+11 0.71 1.44E-12 0.22
Chile 0.130 7.40E+10 5.71E+11 1.30 2.27E-12 0.38
Kenya 0.192 2.77E+10 1.44E+11 0.22 1.50E-12 0.61
Ethiopia 0.139 2.00E+10 1.43E+11 0.11 7.69E-13 0.38
Sub-total (average 
for A30,  γ30	  &	  Φ)
0.130 2.68E+13 2.27E+14 534.8 2.28E-12 0.43
Global value - - - 723.2 - -
Units
per 30 year 
period
US$ per year 
(average 
over period)
US$ Gt of CO2
Gt of CO2 
per US$ none
 
a. Represents a 30-year period.  Multiply by single year value of capital to get 30-year values of output 
and emissions in that 30-year period.  
b. Single year representative value.  Source: Heston et al. (2002) 
c. Emissions from fossil fuel and cement production.  Source: Boden et al. (2010). We are not therefore 
accounting for emissions from LULUCF.  
d. Source: World Bank (2011) World Development Indicators. Φ is the average between 1980 and 2009 
of the percentage of GDP spent on public education, when available, divided by 10.  
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